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INTRODUCTION
Summary judgment is often the make-or-break setting for plaintiffs
alleging illegal employment discrimination. For most plaintiffs, a motion
for summary judgment will end their case. Plaintiffs are losing most of the
cases they file because they are frequently unable to meet the burdens
imposed by an employer's motion for summary judgment.'
Summary judgment in employment discrimination cases poses an
especially burdensome request on plaintiffs who often must rely on
circumstantial evidence to prove illegal discrimination. The seminal
Supreme Court case McDonnell Douglas v. Green intended to pave the
way for plaintiffs to seek redress for discrimination. 2 In reality, McDonnell
Douglas has become a gatekeeper barring legitimate plaintiffs from
reaching the jury. McDonnell Douglas's notoriety is well established; few
other Supreme Court cases draw nearly as much ire amongst academics
and the courts.
3
The state of summary judgment jurisprudence in mixed-motive
employment discrimination cases is best described as fractured.4
Although the Supreme Court has never required that McDonnell Douglas
be applied at summary judgment, several courts of appeals have extended
the use of McDonnell Douglas, or a modified McDonnell Douglas
standard, to summary judgment.5 The rigidity of the McDonnell Douglas
framework has caused many plaintiffs to fall short of meeting their burden
at summary judgment.6 Current summary judgment standards impose
burdens not mandated by, and therefore, in violation of Rule 567 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). 8 As a result, plaintiffs have
been forced to meet a heightened burden because of the use of McDonnell
1. Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use
of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 208-09 (1993).
2. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); McGinley, supra note 1, at 212-13.
3. CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 237 (1985).
4. See infra Part III.B.2.
5. See, e.g., White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 388-89 (6th Cir. 2008);
see also Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 503,
526 (2008).
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. FED. R. Cfv. P. 56. Under Rule 56, a motion for summary judgment should be
granted if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.
8. See infra Parts II, III.
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Douglas at summary judgment. The burden is so high that, as already
mentioned, most plaintiffs are losing their cases.
That result may be about to change if the Sixth Circuit's ruling in
White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. gains traction and swings the pendulum
from a defendant-friendly summary judgment standard to a plaintiff-
friendly summary judgment standard.9 While McDonnell Douglas creates
a heightened burden for plaintiffs to meet at summary judgment, Baxter
effectively removes any burden on a plaintiff necessary to survive an
employer's summary judgment motion.l This news will inevitably please
the many critics of McDonnell Douglas and those who advocate against
the use of a traditional summary judgment standard in employment
discrimination cases." For these people, Baxter may be the panacea for
the problems facing plaintiffs alleging illegal discrimination. But before
other jurisdictions begin to see Baxter as the light at the end of the dark
tunnel that is McDonnell Douglas, this Note asks whether Baxter has
swung the pendulum too far in the opposite direction as a response to
McDonnell Douglas. This Note argues that Baxter violates Rule 56 and
has gone too far in response to McDonnell Douglas. While Rule 56 has
long been a victim of McDonnell Douglas, it appears that Baxter has no
intention of resuscitating Rule 56. Baxter does not fix the summary
judgment problems that McDonnell Douglas created; it merely shifts the
benefit from employers to employees. It is now necessary to revitalize
Rule 56 and ensure that all summary judgment standards meet the
requirements set out in the language of Rule 56.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I of this Note briefly sketches
out the landscape of disparate treatment law from Title VII through the
Supreme Court's 2003 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa decision. Part II
9. 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008).
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See, e.g., Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A
Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
659, 671 (1998) (arguing that "[McDonnell Douglas] does not address or help resolve the
question of whether the plaintiff has met her or his burden of proving that the adverse
employment decision was motivated...by an 'impermissible reason'); Sandra F.
Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas Is Not Justified By
Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 Hous. L. REv. 743, 745-46 (2006)
("McDonnell Douglas has proven unsatisfactory in analyzing discrimination claims.");
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le roi est mort; vive le roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of
McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation on Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa Into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 72 (2003)
("McDonnell Douglas v. Green is dead.... And this report of its death is neither 'greatly
exaggerated' nor a loss deserving of our mourning.").
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discusses the evolution of summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases. Part III explores the circuit split that has developed
among courts of appeals and analyzes how each circuit handles summary
judgment in mixed-motive cases with particular attention being paid to the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Baxter v. Healthcare Corp. This Note will then
argue that both the Baxter and McDonnell Douglas standards infringe on a
plaintiff's and defendant's right to summary judgment under Rule 56 and
should be replaced by a standard that is not only fair to both parties, but
faithful to Rule 56.
I. TITLE VII TO DESERTPALACE:
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN BRIEF
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
On July 2, 1964, after twelve months of work and a debate dubbed
"the longest debate," Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 The
Act aimed to "guarante[e] equal political, social, and economic rights to
all Americans," but Congress recognized that "holding out the right to a
better life for minorities does not guarantee attainment of that better
life."' 13 One of the goals of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is to help
bring that better life to minorities. 14 Under Title VII, employers may not
discriminate on the basis of an individual's "race, color, religion, sex or
national origin."' 5
12. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 3.
13. Id.; see also Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert
Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 911, 956 (2005) (stating Congress's objective
in passing the Act was to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees
over other employees").
14. The Dirksen Congressional Center, Major Features of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, http://www.congresslink.org/print-basicshistmats_ civilrights64text.htm.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). Subsections 2000e-2(a)(1) and (a)(2) state in
full that:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
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In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the Supreme Court noted that there is
a "broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and
consumer, i[n] efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair
and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions."'16 Title VII thus
"tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise."
17
B. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine
Establishing the proper standard for summary judgment in mixed-
motive employment discrimination cases requires an inquiry into the
seminal 1973 Supreme Court case of McDonnell Douglas v. Green. The
primary issue before the Court in McDonnell Douglas was the proper
"order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging
employment discrimination." 18 The Court laid out a tripartite burden-
shifting framework to rectify the "notable lack of harmony" that existed
between the courts of appeals on "the applicable rules as to burden of
proof and how this shifts upon the making of a prima facie case." 19 The
tripartite burden-shifting scheme was instituted to "make it easier for an
employee to prove an employer's discriminatory state of mind.",
20
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test is simple on its face.
First, an employee must establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination. 2 1 The McDonnell Douglas Court said:
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons for the
22complainant's qualifications.
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
16. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 800.
19. Id. at 801.
20. Ezra S. Greenberg, Note, Stray Remarks and Mixed-Motive Cases After Desert
Palace v. Costa: A Proximity Test for Determining Minimal Causation, 29 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1795, 1800 (2008).
21. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
22. Id. The Supreme Court stressed that "facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases,
and the specifications above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id. at n. 13.
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Once an employee has established a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts from the employee to the employer to articulate "some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection., 23 The inquiry
does not end if an employer can articulate a legitimate reason for making
an adverse employment decision. The burden shifts back to the employee
who is then given the opportunity to show that the employer's legitimate
reason is really pretext for a discriminatory action. 24 The courts have used
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme as the dominant tool both
at summary judgment and at trial when dealing with employment
discrimination cases.
2 5
Ten 2y6ears later in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, the Supreme Court sought to clarify the lingering question from
McDonnell Douglas of "whether employers have the ultimate burden of
disproving discrimination or whether employees have the obligation to
prove bias.",27 The Court responded by saying that there are ultimate and
intermediate burdens that the 2plaintiff must meet to successfully prove a
case of illegal discrimination.28 The ultimate burden "remains at all times
with the plaintiff' to prove that the defendant illegally discriminated
against him.29 The McDonnell Douglas framework creates an intermediate
burden on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, which "in effect
creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against
the employee." 30 The defendant then has the burden to rebut the
presumption of discrimination by producing evidence of a legal, non-
discriminatory reason for making an adverse employment decision.3 ' If the
defendant can successfully rebut the presumption, the burden of
production returns to the plaintiff and merges with his ultimate burden of
23. Id. at 802.
24. Id. at 804.
25.Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treat-
ment Law: McDonnell Douglas's Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. Bus.
L.J. 511,519 (2008).
26. 450 U.S. 248 (1983).
27. Christopher R. Hedican et al., McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 DRAKE L.
REv. 383, 386 (2004). The Court framed the question as "whether, after the plaintiff has
proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the burden shifts to the defendant
to persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence that legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action existed." Burdine, 450
U.S. at 250.
28. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 254.
31. Id.
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persuasion that he is a victim of discrimination.
32
McDonnell Douglas established a burden-shifting framework to
evaluate discrimination cases. Burdine answered a lingering question from
McDonnell Douglas about whether the ultimate burden of proof shifted
from plaintiff (employee) to defendant (employer) to disprove illegal
discrimination by declaring that the ultimate burden at all times remains
with the plaintiff.
3 3
C. Price Waterhouse and Congress s Response
1. Price Waterhouse: the Birth of the Mixed-Motive Case
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
34
Ann Hopkins was a manager at the accounting firm Price Waterhouse and
a candidate for partnership. 35 Hopkins was the only female out of 88
individuals being reviewed for partnership. 36 Price Waterhouse solicited
its partners for their input on whether a candidate should be admitted into
partnership. 37 When the comments came back from the partners, many,
including those who supported her bid for partnership, said that she
needed to work on her "interpersonal skills. 38 Accompanying these
legitimate concerns about Hopkins were negative comments stemming
from the fact that Hopkins was a female.3 9 Hopkins was described as
"macho" and that she "overcompensated for being a woman;" she was told
to take "a course at charm school;" and, in the "coup de grace" comment,
Hopkins was told to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry. '4°
Because Hopkins's evaluations were filled with both legitimate and
illegitimate criticisms, the traditional analysis under McDonnell Douglas
32. Id. at 256.
33. See supra notes 26-32.
34. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
35. Id. at 233.
36. Id.
37. Id. Candidates could be either admitted into partnership, have their candidacy
placed on hold, or have their candidacy rejected. Id.
38. Id. at 234-35. The Court noted that "[i]ong before her bid for partnership, partners
evaluating her work had counseled her to improve her relations with staff members." Id
at 234. Apparently, Hopkins was "aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and
impatient with staff." Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp.
1109, 1113 (1985)).
39. Id. at 235.
40. Id.
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was inappropriate. 4 1 In "pretext cases" or single motive cases, the question
is "whether the unlawful consideration or legitimate consideration was
actually the basis for the action.' 42 In mixed-motive cases, such as Price
Waterhouse, both legitimate and illegitimate considerations are actually
the basis for the adverse employment action.43 The plurality in Price
Waterhouse held that if Hopkins's gender (the illegitimate consideration)
was a motivating factor for an adverse employment action, Price Water-
house could only avoid liability by showing it would have made the same
decision despite considering Hopkins's gender. Justice Brennan stated
that a factor is a motivating factor "if we asked the employer at the
moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful
response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee
was a woman.
'45
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse has been "treated
as the operative holding of the Court.' '46 O'Connor argued that a
"disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision.' '47 This
heightened evidentiary requirement "introduced the concept of a
mandatory McDonnell Douglas."'48 O'Connor worried that most plaintiffs
would pick the Price Waterhouse framework over the McDonnell Douglas
framework.49 The direct evidence requirement acts as a guardian, allowing
only individuals with direct evidence the opportunity to proceed with the
easier mixed-motive, as opposed to the pretext, framework.5 °
There are several differences between the McDonnell Douglas pretext
framework and the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive framework.? 1 The
mixed-motive framework shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant
41. Montgomery v. John Deere & Co., 169 F.3d 556, 562 (8th Cir. 1999) (Lay, J.,
concurring) ("In such cases ... [the] McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment analysis is
inappropriate.").
42. Cassandra A. Giles, Note, Shaking Price Waterhouse: Suggestions for a More
Workable Approach to Title VII Mixed Motive Disparate Treatment Discrimination
Claims, 37 IND. L. REV. 815, 819 (2004).
43. Id.
44. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45.
45. Id. at 250.
46. Prenkert, supra note 25, at 532.
47. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276.
48. Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109,
118 (2007).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Giles, supra note 42, at 820.
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once the plaintiff shows that an impermissible factor was a motivating
factor in an adverse employment decision.52 A plaintiff would prefer to
bring a mixed-motive claim as opposed to a pretext claim because a
mixed-motive plaintiff is only required to show that an impermissible
factor motivated an employer instead of having to prove that all legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by a defendant are pretextual.
Because employers were able to avoid liability in mixed-motive cases
by showing that they would have taken the same action despite being
motivated by an impermissible reason, Price Waterhouse "allowed
employers to escape liability in mixed motive discrimination cases"
because "the legitimate motive served to defeat the plaintiffs claim."
54
2. Congress Passes the 1991 Civil Rights Act
Price Waterhouse limited the liability of employers who were able to
show that they would have nevertheless made the same employment
decision regardless of any impermissible factor coloring their decision.55
Congress, partly in response to Price Waterhouse, passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.56 The Act amended Title VII to add 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m),
codifying the motivating factor standard from Price Waterhouse.57 Now,
"an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.
Under Price Waterhouse, the employer could completely avoid
liability.5 9 Now, the employer can only reduce the scopRe of remedies
available to a successful plaintiff and not avoid liability. ° An employer
who successfully shows that it would have taken the same action
regardless of an impermissible factor is only subject to "declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, and attorney's fees; but may not be awarded damages or
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See supra Part I.C.I.
56. Giles, supra note 42, at 820-2 1.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
58. Id.
59. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) ("We conclude that the
preservation of [freedom of choice] means that an employer shall not be liable if it can
prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same
decision regarding a particular person.").
60. Giles, supra note 42, at 821.
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an order requiring admission, reinstatement, promotion, or payment."
61
Price Waterhouse's mixed-motive standard created a second way to
evaluate employment discrimination cases.62 For many plaintiffs, the
mixed-motive method was preferable to McDonnell Douglas. It is not
surprising then, in the wake of Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, that the "Courts of Appeals have divided over whether a plaintiff
must prove by direct evidence that an impermissible consideration was a
'motivating factor' in an adverse employment action." 63 The Supreme
Court would answer that question in 2003 with its decision in Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa.
64
D. Desert Palace: The Death of McDonnell Douglas?
In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that a Title VII disparate treatment
plaintiff no longer needed to produce direct evidence to receive a mixed-
motive jury instruction.65 The Court's deceptively simple decision in
Desert Palace sent lawyers, judges, and professors scrambling to
66 6determine whether McDonnell Douglas was alive or dead.67 One
61. Id.
62. See supra Parts I.B and I.C. 1 for an explanation of the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis and the mixed-motive analysis under Price Waterhouse.
63. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003).
64. Id. at 100.
65. Id. at 101.
66. See Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman, Much Ado About Nothing-Why
Desert Palace Neither Murdered McDonnell Douglas Nor Transformed All Employment
Discrimination Cases to Mixed-Motive, 36 ST. MARY's L.J. 395, 396-97 (2005) ("Simply
looking to the Supreme Court's statement of the case should dispel the notion that Desert
Palace banished McDonnell Douglas to the history books ... [t]hus, Desert Palace is not
the torch of McDonnell Douglas's funeral pyre."); see also Hedican et al., supra note 27,
at 384 (concurring with Scott by stating "[t]he numerous Supreme Court decisions
interpreting and applying McDonnell Douglas, and the decision in Costa itself amply
demonstrate that McDonnell Douglas is alive and well").
67. See William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 Hous.
L. REV. 1549, 1562 (2005) [hereinafter Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave] ("From what
the Court said, it necessarily follows that McDonnell Douglas is gone."); William R.
Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 199, 200 (2003) ("Make no mistake about it, for Title VII claims at least, the old
McDonnell Douglas proof structure is as dead as a doornail."); Van Detta, supra note 11,
at 72 ("McDonnell Douglas v. Green is dead. With apologies to Dickens, it is 'dead as a
doornail'-along with its traveling companion, Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine. And this report is neither 'greatly exaggerated' nor a loss deserving of our
mourning.").
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commentator said, "[n]o issue is more crucial to the litigation of
intentional discrimination cases than determining" whether the Desert
Palace decision "unceremoniously toppled McDonnell Douglas without
even bothering to mention the case by name."
68
In a short, eight-page opinion, Justice Thomas made it clear from the
plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) that direct evidence is not
required for a plaintiff to receive a mixed-motive jury instruction.
69
Justice Thomas noted, "[O]n its face, the statute does not mention, much
less require, that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct
evidence.,70  Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) a plaintiff must
"demonstrate[] that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice.' Congress defined the
word "demonstrates" as "meets the burdens of production and
persuasion." 72 If Congress intended a heightened evidentiary burden, as
required by Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse, "it
could have made that intent clear by including language to that effect."73
Despite Justice Thomas plainly stating that the question before the
Court was "whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of
discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)" and never mentioning McDonnell Douglas in his
opinion, many believed that Desert Palace ended McDonnell Douglas's
reign.74 The Supreme Court in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez dispelled the
myth that McDonnell Douglas had been toppled by Desert Palace.75 In
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, a post Desert Palace case, the Supreme Court
applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis to an American with Disabilities
Act disparate treatment case. 76 Further, Justice Thomas made no mention
of Desert Palace in the Raytheon opinion and, by applying the supposedly
toppled McDonnell Douglas analysis, confirmed what many Title VII
plaintiffs know: McDonnell Douglas is alive and well.77
68. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave, supra note 67, at 1550.
69. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101.
70. Id. at 98-99.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (2006).
73. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99.
74. See supra notes 66-67.
75. See Prenkert, supra note 25, at 554.
76. 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003). The Desert Palace decision came on June 9th and the
Raytheon decision followed on December 2nd. Id. at 44.
77. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 n.5 (4th Cir.
2005) ("[S]ince deciding Desert Palace, the Supreme Court has continued to invoke the
burden-shifting framework in pretext cases.").
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Before Price Waterhouse, employment discrimination cases were
analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme.78 This
proved to be inadequate because McDonnell Douglas was not designed to
deal with employers who considered both legitimate and illegitimate
motives when making an adverse employment decision. 79 Price
Waterhouse created the mixed-motive case to rectify situations where an
employer was motivated by permissible and impermissible factors. 80 The
Supreme Court instituted a motivating factor test to handle such cases.
Part II of this Note will discuss the current state of summary judgment law
in light of the 1986 trilogy of summary judgment decisions and how those
cases affect summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
For most plaintiffs alleging illegal discrimination, a defendant's
motion for summary judgment will result in the plaintiffs claims being
dismissed. Professor Charles Sullivan summed up the state of employment
discrimination practice by saying "plaintiffs are losing almost all of the
cases they file." 81 To properly assess the correct standard for summary
judgment in mixed-motive employment discrimination cases, it is necess-
ary to briefly cover current summary judgment jurisprudence and Rule 56
of the FRCP.
Rule 56 allows a plaintiff or defendant to move for summary judgment
and quickly bring litigation to an end.82 A motion for summary judgment
78. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The evidentiary rule the Court adopts today should be viewed as a
supplement to the careful framework established by our unanimous decision in
McDonnell Douglas.").
79. Id. at 247 ("Where a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate motives, however, it simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate
reason was 'the true reason' ... for the decision-which is the question asked by
Burdine."); Linda H. Krieger, The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv 1161, 1179
(1995) ("Within the pretext paradigm, it is simply not possible for an employment
decision to be both motivated by the employer's articulated reasons and tainted by
intergroup bias; the trier of fact must decide between the two.").
80. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244 ("[W]hile an employer may not take gender
into account in making an employment decision ... it is free to decide against a woman
for other reasons.").
81. Sullivan, supra note 13, at 912.
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and
when "the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."83 Many
critics believe summary judgment deprives litigants of their day in court;
proponents believe summary judgment serves the important function of
keeping court dockets clear of meritless cases. 84 Judge Selya of the First
Circuit has said that "summary judgment has proven its usefulness as a
means of avoiding full-dress trials in unwinnable cases, thereby freeing
courts to utilize scarce judicial resources in more beneficial ways."
85
In 1986, the Supreme Court's rulings in three summary judgment
cases, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,86
87Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, and Celotex v. Catrett,88 completely changed
the landscape in employment discrimination summary judgment
proceedings. 89 This trilogy of summary judgment proceedings has made it
"easier for defendants to obtain summary judgment in cases of at least
arguable discrimination." 90 This was a stark change from the prior use of
summary judgment. Courts are no longer reluctant to grant summary
judgment in cases where "there exist questions of fact concerning the
employer's motive, thereby denying to employment discrimination
plaintiffs their 'day in court' historically promised by the American model
of litigation."91
In Anderson, a libel case, the Court was asked whether a court ruling
on summary judgment must consider the evidentiary standard when
making its decision. 92 The Court ruled in the affirmative, saying that a
"judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the
substantive evidentiary burden." 93  Therefore, in employment
discrimination cases, the judge will undoubtedly use the McDonnell
Douglas framework to make summary judgment determinations. 94 The
83. Id.
84. William W. Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment
Motions: A Monograph on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 F.R.D.
441,451 (1991).
85. Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991).
86. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
87. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
88. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
89. McGinley, supra note 1, at 206 (1993).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 207.
92. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 244.
93. Id. at 255.
94. See McGinley, supra note 1, at 222. The Supreme Court originally adopted the
McDonnell Douglas approach to ease the plaintiffs burden of proving a prima facie case,
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Anderson decision means that "trial courts are obligated to determine not
only whether there is a factual dispute, but whether the evidence identified
in the summary judgment opposition would satisfy the plaintiffs burden
of proof at trial., 95 Courts now must evaluate a party's evidence and
determine its probative value at summary judgment. 6 A nonmoving party
cannot point to some "supporting evidence" to satisfy his burden of
production "if it will not sustain the burden of proof on the merits."
97
After Celotex v. Catrett, a defendant may successfully move for
summary judgment merely by pointing out "that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." 98 In essence, the
defendant only has to point out that the plaintiff has insufficient evidence
to raise a "genuine issue as to any material fact." Summary judgment post-
Celotex has loosened the burden on the defendant to prove an absence of
any genuine issue of material fact and requires the plaintiff to
affirmatively show that such an issue exists. 99 In the employment
discrimination context, this requires the plaintiff to "meet the ultimate
burden of proof at the summary judgment stage" instead of at trial.100
The decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.l0 1 suggests that "issues such as intent and motive may be appro-
priate for determination by a motion for summary judgment."'1 2 Read
but the McDonnell Douglas standard is now being used to defeat a plaintiff s claim. Id at
229. Professor McGinley notes that "there is a growing trend toward placing a much
higher burden on the plaintiff to meet the 'qualified' prong of the prima facie case." Id.
Courts originally looked at objective evidence, an employee's education and experience,
to determine whether a person was qualified, but now plaintiffs are being forced to
"rebut" the employer's defense that the employee is not qualified by proving that they are
qualified. Id. at 230. This "perversion" of the McDonnell Douglas framework compounds
the problems that a disparate treatment plaintiff has making a claim to courts that
typically are hostile. Id. at 231 ("Courts believe defendants when they articulate their
non-discriminatory reasons for the employment decision and disbelieve plaintiffs when
they attempt to prove that the defendants' articulated reasons are pretextual.").
95. Leland Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext: Resolving the Summary
Judgment Confusion in Employment Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment,
4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 37, 47 (2000).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (emphasis in original).
99. Id. ("[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'-that is,
pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case.").
100. McGinley, supra note 1, at 241-42.
101. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
102. Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment
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broadly, Matsushita instructs trial judges to "weigh the evidence and to
decide which inference was more reasonable in light of the evidence."'
0 3
This role is typically reserved for the jury.'0 4 Like Anderson, Matshushita
"urged trial judges to evaluate the probative value of evidence at the
summary judgment stage."' 0 5 In addition to the Anderson requirement that
judges evaluate the probative value of evidence, if there is a question of
plausibility on the theory of liability, more evidence is necessary to avert
summary judgment. 1
06
The trilogy of summary judgment cases decided in 1986 have made
obtaining summary judgment much easier.10 7 Subsequently, courts have
taken these decisions and applied them in employment discrimination
cases with greater frequency. Not surprisingly, the courts of appeals
disagree on the proper standard for summary judgment in mixed-motive
cases. Part III of this Note will discuss how both the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting test and the motivating factor test from Price Waterhouse
are used by courts in making determinations of summary judgment in
mixed-motive employment discrimination cases. This Note posits that
both the McDonnell Douglas and mixed-motive summary judgment
standards violate Rule 56.
III. BAXTER AND MCDONNELL DOUGLAS:
RUNNING ROUGHSHOD OVER RULE 56
The federal courts of appeals' approaches to summary judgment in
mixed-motive cases can be broken into four distinct groups: three groups
applying a variation of the McDonnell Douglas standard and the recently
devised Sixth Circuit standard. 0 9 Five circuits have made no decision or
have refrained from deciding the appropriate standard for summary
judgment in a mixed-motive case.' 10 Summary judgment in mixed-motive
Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 71, 93 (1999).
103. McGinley, supra note 1, at 227.
104. Id.
105. Ware, supra note 95, at 48.
106. Id. at 48-49.
107. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation
Explosion, " "Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Clichs Eroding Our Day in Court and
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1041-44 (2003) ("On a practical level,
the three decisions collectively forge a new, stronger role for [summary judgment].").
108. Ware, supra note 95, at 49.
109. See infra Parts III.A and B.
110. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 399 (6th Cir. 2008). The Second
and Seventh Circuits have not considered the issue, and the First, Third, and Tenth
20101
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cases is in need of a uniform standard that not only adequately balances
the rights of plaintiffs and defendants, but also is consistent with the
language of Rule 56 of the FRCP. Because "there is no separate rule of
civil procedure governing summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases," all the circuits' approaches must abide by Rule 56
of the FRCP. "'
As discussed above, l" 2 a moving party is entitled to summary
judgment when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and ...
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.""' 3 The Sixth
Circuit's ruling in Baxter appears to drop this already low bar to a level
that effectively removes summary judgment from the equation in mixed-
motive disparate treatment cases. Conversely, the McDonnell Douglas
framework has raised the bar plaintiffs must meet to survive a motion for
summary judgment. These standards must be remedied to be consistent
and faithful with Rule 56.
A. Baxter and the Effective Elimination of Summary Judgment
The Sixth Circuit in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. declined to
extend the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to summary
judgment in mixed-motive cases.' 14 The Baxter court's holding "that the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework does not apply to
the summary judgment analysis of Title VII mixed-motive claims""
5
creates an official circuit split and makes the Sixth Circuit the first circuit
to repudiate the use of the McDonnell Douglas standard in mixed-motive
cases at the summary judgment stage. "16
To survive the motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff "asserting a
mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a
jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the
plaintiff; and (2) 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor' for the defendant's adverse employment action." '117 The
Circuits have refrained from making a decision. Id.
111. Beiner, supra note 102, at 96 (quoting Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103
F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997)).
112. See supra Part II.
113. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c)(2).
114. Baxter, 533 F.3d at 400.
115. Id. (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at 398-99.
117. Id. at 400 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) (emphasis in original). The court
relied on Judge Moore's concurrence in Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 716
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burden on the plaintiff is not onerous and "should preclude sending the
case to the jury only where the record is devoid of evidence that could
reasonably be construed to support the plaintiff's claim."" 8 Because of the
Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace, the Sixth Circuit held that the
new summary judgment analysis will govern all Title VII mixed-motive
cases "regardless of the type of proof presented by the plaintiff."
'"19
In explaining why the court declined to extend McDonnell Douglas to
the summary judgment analysis, the Sixth Circuit believed McDonnell
Douglas is "not needed when assessing whether trial is warranted in the
mixed-motive context."' 120 The McDonnell Douglas analysis is effective
for single-motive cases because it effectively "smok[es] out the single
ultimate reason for the adverse employment decision."'121 A plaintiff in a
mixed-motive case needs only to show that the defendant impermissibly
relied on a protected characteristic and that the protected characteristic
"was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice."'122 Thus, to survive a summary
judgment motion, a plaintiff need only establish that a discriminatory
animus played a part in the employment decision and not rebut all
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant.' 
23
The question for the court is whether the plaintiff is able to produce
sufficient evidence that his protected status played a motivating role in a
defendant's employment decision.' 24 A court making a summary judgment
determination must ask not
whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to survive the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine shifting burdens, but rather whether there
are any genuine issues of material fact concerning the defendant's
motivation for its adverse employment decision, and, if none are
present, whether the law-42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)-supports a
(6th Cir. 2006). ("[A]n employee raising a mixed-motive claim can defeat an employer's
motion for summary judgment by presenting evidence--either direct or circumstantial-
to 'demonstrate' that a protected characteristic 'was a motivating factor for an
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."' (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 401.
121. Id. at 400 (quoting Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 720 (6th Cir.
2006) (Moore, J., concurring)).
122. Id. at 401 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) (emphasis in original).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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judgment in favor of the moving party on the basis of undisputed
facts. 1
25
Summary judgment is not appropriate once a prima facie case has been
established either through the introduction of actual evidence or the
McDonnell Douglas presumption because "the crux of a Title VII dispute
is the 'elusive factual question of intentional discrimination."' 26 Summary
judgment motions are not ideal in employment discrimination cases
because discerning an employer's true motive requires "a searching
inquiry into these motives, those [acting for impermissible motives] could
easily mask their behavior behind a complex web of post hoc
rationalizations.' 27 A plaintiff "will necessarily have raised a genuine
issue of material fact" when he establishes a primafacie case making out a
case of intentional discrimination against his employer.'
28
Normally, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment if the plaintiff
has failed to raise a "genuine issue as to any material fact ... and is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.', 129 Under Baxter, the "sufficient
evidence" requirement for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment
militates only enough evidence for the record not to be "devoid" of
evidence. 130 For the Baxter standard and the Rule 56 requirement to be
squared, "devoid of evidence" must be evaluated the same as a "no
genuine issue as to any material fact."' 31 Thus, if a plaintiff can put forth
any evidence that could reasonably be construed to support his claim, he
has created a genuine issue of material fact. In a system where any
evidence becomes genuine, a nongenuine issue cannot exist. After Baxter,
a plaintiff need only show enough evidence, seemingly any evidence, to
avoid a trial judge finding the record to be "devoid of evidence."', 32 The
Baxter court has circumvented Rule 56 with its lower standard by
mandating that any evidence will create a genuine issue of material fact.
125. Id. at 402. The Baxter court was uncomfortable with applying summary judgment
to employment discrimination cases because juries are better equipped to handle fact
intensive inquires. Id. ("'[I]nquiries regarding what actually motivated an employer's
decision are very fact intensive' and 'will generally be difficult to determine at the
summary judgment stage."' (quoting Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 721
(6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, J., concurring))).
126. Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir.1985).
127. Id. (citing Peacock v. DuVal, 694 F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir. 1982)).
128. Id.
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
130. Baxter, 533 F.3d at 400.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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The Baxter standard seems to return to the pre-1986 standard for
summary judgment "when a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the
nonmovant's case, or the slightest doubt as to the facts, was considered
cause for denying a motion." 133 The Celotex line of cases departed from
that standard to a test of "whether a reasonable jury could find for the
nonmovant."' 34 Basically, to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiffs
evidence must be "sufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict or a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict."' 35 If it cannot, "a trial would be
pointless."' 36 Baxter's standard, however, does not require that the
plaintiffs evidence be sufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict
or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Instead, the plaintiff need only
produce enough evidence so the record is not "devoid of evidence" that
can be reasonably construed to support the plaintiff s claim.' 
37
Several problems arise with effectively removing summary judgment
from mixed-motive cases. First, the Supreme Court, the drafter of the
FRCP, has not stated that employment discrimination cases are to be
treated differently from other types of cases when deciding the sufficiency
of a summary judgment motion.1 38 Baxter seeks to classify mixed-motive
disparate treatment cases as a special category worthy of a different
summary judgment standard. The standard laid out in Baxter does not
require plaintiffs to show that a "genuine issue as to any material fact"
exists, but instead to meet a standard that is less burdensome than Rule 56
currently prescribes to survive summary judgment.139 If employment
discrimination cases are unique and worthy of a special summary
judgment standard, the Supreme Court should then promulgate rules
explicitly making employment discrimination cases unique. This would
create uniformity across the circuits.
Another problem that occurs from lowering the standard to survive
summary judgment is the inevitable increase in legal fees. Put simply,
133. Schwarzer et al., supra note 84, at 477.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See supra note 130.
138. Beiner, supra note 102, at 96 (quoting Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103
F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
139. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 56 ("The Judgment sought should be rendered if... there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law."), with White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 433 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir.
2008) ("This burden of producing some evidence in support of a mixed-motive claim is
not onerous and should preclude sending the case to jury only where the record is devoid
of evidence that could reasonably be construed to support the plaintiff's claim.").
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more cases will survive summary judgment and proceed to trial. The
increased legal work necessitates that higher fees will be charged because
of the extra work involved in trying a case as opposed to disposing of it at
the summary judgment stage. Legitimate claims should not be discouraged
because of an increase in legal fees, but at the same time, Rule 56 is useful
in pointing out which cases should not proceed to trial because the law
does not provide a remedy. 40 Baxter's standard will not be as effective at
pointing out those cases for which the law does not provide a remedy
because cases without a "genuine issue as to any material fact" will
survive summary judgment. Those cases will proceed to trial and
ultimately fail because the plaintiff is unable to meet his burden.
Rule 56 was designed to avoid cases going to trial that are based on
insufficient claims. 4 Summary judgment is meant to "strip away the
underbrush and lay bare the heart of the controversy between the
parties." 142 Essential to a proper summary judgment standard is the
balance between the rights of both parties. When a plaintiff brings a case
based on an insufficient claim, the employer's rights are infringed because
it is forced to pay legal costs for cases that would otherwise be disposed of
at summary judgment. When cases survive summary judgment despite
lacking a genuine issue of material fact, the equities between the parties
are not properly balanced. The rights of the plaintiff will be discussed
further in the next section, but needless to say, the Supreme Court has
found that the proper balance for summary judgment is a standard
requiring a genuine issue of a material fact. 1
43
Rule 56 is undoubtedly a "powerful docket-clearing device essential to
overburdened courts."' 44 If the Baxter standard gains more traction, courts
will inevitably face an upswing in employment discrimination cases that
would typically get settled at the summary judgment stage. By gutting the
power of Rule 56, the Baxter court has essentially removed all the benefits
of Rule 56, leaving a hollow shell which will bar only cases "devoid of
evidence" and send to trial cases which would not survive a standard
summary judgment motion. 145
Critics may argue that the Baxter standard does not require a lower
standard than Rule 56 mandates. When courts apply the Baxter standard,
judges can make their determinations of judgment based on whether any
140. See Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991).
141. Schwarzer et al., supra note 84, at 451.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 445.
145. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008).
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issue of genuine fact exists. However, the Baxter court made it clear that
courts "should preclude sending the case to the jury only where the record
is devoid of evidence that could reasonably be construed to support the
plaintiff's claim."'146 In many cases, the courts will have evidence that will
raise an issue of genuine fact. But when there is evidence that does not
raise an issue of genuine fact, courts are instructed to send the case to the
jury because the record is "not devoid of evidence.' 4 7 It is in those
instances, where the Baxter standard lowers the bar and is unfaithful to
Rule 56.
B. McDonnell Douglas: Raising the Standard of Summary Judgment
1. The Failings of McDonnell Douglas at Summary Judgment
While the Baxter standard sets the bar too low for summary judgment,
McDonnell Douglas goes too far in the opposite direction and bars cases
which should survive summary judgment. As discussed previously, the
McDonnell Douglas framework "serves to bring the litigants and the court
expeditiously and fairly" to the ultimate question of discrimination.
148
Despite the original intent of the McDonnell Douglas Court, the
McDonnell Douglas analysis has acted steadfastly as a bulwark for
employers, disallowing legitimate plaintiffs to have their day in court. 4 9
Put bluntly, "plaintiffs are losing almost all of the cases they file."
'150
Plaintiffs are losing employment discrimination cases because of the
problems of proving pretext under the third prong of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis.' 5 As discussed above,' 52 a plaintiff must first establish
a prima facie case. Typically this was a mere formality for most plaintiffs
who could objectively show that they met the qualifications. Now "there is
a growing trend toward placing a much higher burden on the plaintiff to
meet the 'qualified' prong of the prima facie case."'1 53 Some courts have
"imposed a higher burden on plaintiffs" to prove that they are qualified by
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1983).
149. McGinley, supra note 1, at 229. Interestingly, McGinley believes that McDonnell
Douglas is the proper standard for summary judgment, but she believes that the standard
has been misapplied after the summary judgment trilogy of cases. Id. at 221.
150. Sullivan, supra note 13, at 912.
151. See McGinley, supra note 1, at 208-09.
152. See supra Part I.B.
153. McGinley, supra note 1, at 229.
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rebutting a defendant's argument that they are not.' 54 This puts a plaintiff
in the summary judgment stage at a disadvantage because he does not
have the benefit of a cross-examination to rebut the defendant's claim that
he is not qualified.
155
If the plaintiff is able to make out a prima facie case and raise an
inference of illegal discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant
to prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.' 56 Professor Jeffrey Van
Detta believes the only purpose of requiring a defendant to establish a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is to force the plaintiff to "tackle a
whole new obstacle of tearing down the [legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason] even though it may not really be the employer's motivation at
all!' 15 7 This shifts the burden in summary judgment from the defendant,
the typical moving party, who must prove that there is "no genuine issue
as to any material fact," to the plaintiff, the typical nonmoving party, "to
prove not only a prima facie case, but to effectively start over again by
mounting evidence to attack an assertion-not a fact that will necessarily
be proven at trial-that is the employer's mere articulation."' 5 8 In most
summary judgment cases, the evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, but under the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, the court "must effectively ignore the admonition to draw all
inferences in the plaintiff s (nonmoving party's) favor." 1
59
When the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,
which it must to avoid liability, the plaintiff then has the arduous task of
proving that the case is pretext.' 60 A plaintiff seeking to prove pretext
"'must produce evidence of such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder
could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the
employer did not act for the asserted nondiscriminatory reasons."", 16 1 The
pretext inquiry "is necessarily a motive inquiry," aiming to determine
whether the employer honestly believed the legitimate, nondiscriminatory
154. Id. at 230-31.
155. Id. at 231.
156. For a discussion on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme, see supra
Part I.B.
157. Van Detta, supra note 11, at 101.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
161. See Tymkovich, supra note 5, at 504 (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d
1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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reason it articulated and whether it truly acted upon that reason or upon an
impermissible factor.' 
62
Forcing a plaintiff to prove pretext at the summary judgment stage
requires the plaintiff to prove the ultimate issue of the case without the
fact-finding benefits that a trial has to offer. The pretext step is "nothing
more than a second injection of the inappropriate burden to prove
intent."' 63 The burden on the plaintiff then, is to produce circumstantial
evidence to create a prima facie case, and then upon an employer's
articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, produce "more and
different evidence of intent" to survive summary judgment and a directed
verdict. 164
When the plaintiff produces the "more and different" evidence to
prove pretext, there is a tendency for judges to pick apart the plaintiffs
evidence and consider each piece individually. It is the job of the fact-
finder to look at all of the evidence and determine whether it is more likely
than not that an impermissible factor motivated an adverse employment
decision. 166 When a judge looks at each piece of evidence individually, he
effectively "undercuts the plaintiffs case."' 67 If all the evidence is not
considered together, it is easy for the courts to look at each piece of
evidence individually and determine that each piece, standing alone, does
not sufficiently discredit the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason.168 In doing so, the courts "have improperly drawn inferences
against the plaintiff on the question of whether the plaintiff created a
genuine issue of material fact as to the veracity of the [legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason].' 69 The burden on the plaintiffs then is not
only to raise a genuine issue of any material fact, the standard Rule 56
requirement, "but to do so 'with great specificity' targeted precisely at the
factual basis of the [legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason]."
Under Rule 56, a moving party must show that there is "no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law" to have his motion granted.' 7 ' In employment
162. Id. at 504.
163. Van Detta, supra note 11, at 102.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 104; see also McGinley, supra note 1, at 233-34.
166. McGinley, supra note 1, at 233.
167. Id.
168. Van Detta, supra note 11, at 105.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. FED. R. Cv. P. 56.
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discrimination, the proper Rule 56 inquiry is "whether the defendant has
demonstrated that there are insufficient facts from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that the defendant discriminated against the
plaintiff."' 172 Instead, many post-Celotex courts have shifted the burden
from the defendant to the plaintiff to prove at the summary judgment stage
that he was discriminated against. 173 The plaintiff then bears the ultimate
burden of proving illegal discrimination at summary judgment instead. 1
74
The role of the McDonnell Douglas standard, especially post-Celotex,
has been one of a gatekeeper. Rule 56 was intended only to kick out cases
when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact."'175 Under the
McDonnell Douglas analysis, the plaintiff must successfully navigate
challenges at every step of the analysis before dealing with the largest
hurdle: proving pretext. 7 6 Proving pretext is necessarily an inquiry into
motive. An inquiry of motive should not be done at the summary
judgment stage because "an employer's true motivations are particularly
difficult to ascertain."' 177 This is because "[t]here will seldom be
'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes."'178 To
uncover an employer's true motivations requires factual determinations
that are typically "unsuitable for disposition at the summary judgment
stage."
79
The proper question at summary judgment, as Professor Ann
McGinley has pointed out, is "whether the defendant has demonstrated
that there are insufficient facts from which a jury could reasonably
conclude that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff." 180 Courts
that have required plaintiffs to prove the ultimate issue at the summary
judgment proceeding have foisted a higher burden on plaintiffs than Rule
56 mandates. The plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving that
illegal discrimination occurred, but that burden is meant to be proved at
trial and not at the summary judgment stage.' 8 ' Both Baxter and
172. McGinley, supra note 1, at 241.
173. Id. at 241-42.
174. Id.
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
176. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
177. Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 564 (6th Cir. 2004).
178. Id. (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
716 (1983)).
179. Id.
180. McGinley, supra note 1, at 241.
181. Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1983) ("[T]he
plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie
case of discrimination.").
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McDonnell Douglas run roughshod over Rule 56, impermissibly tilting the
balance towards plaintiffs and employers, respectively, without balancing
the rights of both plaintiffs and employers, which is the intent behind Rule
56.
However, there are two main arguments for why McDonnell Douglas
does not violate Rule 56. The first argument rests on the assumption that
McDonnell Douglas is the appropriate standard because it has been the
law since 1972. This argument does not address the issue, but instead
posits that McDonnell Douglas is valid merely because it has not been
overruled. The second and stronger argument is based on the belief that
McDonnell Douglas does not create a heightened burden for the plaintiff.
And if the plaintiff is unable to prove pretext at summary judgment, he
should not be entitled to have his case sent to the jury. This argument
misses the point. The question at the summary judgment stage is whether
there is any genuine issue of material fact. It is not proper for the plaintiff
to be forced to meet his ultimate burden at summary judgment. Because
McDonnell Douglas forces the plaintiff to rebut the defendant's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for taking an adverse employment action with
evidence of pretext, the plaintiff must meet its ultimate burden. That is, a
plaintiff must not only prove that a genuine issue of fact exists, but he also
must prove the intentional discrimination at the summary judgment stage.
Rule 56 does not require the heightened burden that McDonnell Douglas
places on summary judgment.
When McDonnell Douglas is applied at summary judgment it
negatively affects plaintiffs' rights. There are three distinct groups of
circuit courts that follow either McDonnell Douglas or a variation of
McDonnell Douglas when deciding summary judgment motions.' 82 For
clarity, this Note will refer to the three different groups as the McDonnell
Douglas Group, the Modified McDonnell Douglas Group, and McDonnell
Douglas or Motivating Factor Group. Only one of these standards,
McDonnell Douglas or Motivating Factor Group, is faithful and consistent
with Rule 56.
2. Two McDonnell Douglas Groups Violate Rule 56
This Note argues that the McDonnell Douglas and Modified
McDonnell Douglas Groups' standards are unfaithful to Rule 56 because
they force plaintiffs to proceed completely or at least partially under the
McDonnell Douglas rubric. The McDonnell Douglas or Motivating Factor
182. See infra Part III.B.2.
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Group standard is faithful and consistent with Rule 56, even though a
plaintiff may use the McDonnell Douglas standard, because he also has
the option of proceeding under the motivating factor standard. The
standard used by the McDonnell Douglas or Motivating Factor Group
should be the preferred test for summary judgment in mixed-motive
employment discrimination cases.
The Eighth'83 and Eleventh 84 Circuits comprise the McDonnell
Douglas Group, and they have concluded that Desert Palace has not
changed the appropriate standard for summary judgment in mixed-motive
cases. In Griffith v. City of Des Moines, the Eighth Circuit held that a
plaintiff can survive summary judgment in one of two ways. 185 First, a
plaintiff can show proof of "direct evidence of discrimination."' 8 6 If a
plaintiff is able to produce direct evidence, which creates an inference of
illegal discrimination, he is able to survive a defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 187 Alternatively, if the plaintiff is unable to produce
direct evidence and create an inference of illegal discrimination, he must
attempt to create that inference through the tripartite McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis.'
88
The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit in the Modified McDonnell
Douglas Group. In reaction to Desert Palace, the Fifth Circuit has
modified the traditional McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis. 18 9 This
modified standard approach starts the same as the traditional McDonnell
183.Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e conclude
that Desert Palace had no impact on prior Eighth Circuit summary judgment decisions.").
184.Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11 th Cir. 2004). The court was reluctant
to hold that Desert Palace overruled McDonnell Douglas because McDonnell Douglas
was never mentioned in the Desert Palace opinion. Id.
185. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736.
186. Id. Evidence is direct when it "show[s] a specific link between the alleged
discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a
reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated" the employer in
making an adverse employment decision. Id. (quoting Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank of
Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66, (8th Cir. 1997)). Direct evidence "is not the converse of circum-
stantial evidence" but refers to the "causal strength of the proof." Id.
187. Id. ("A plaintiff with strong (direct) evidence that illegal discrimination motivated
the employer's adverse action does not need the three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis
to get to the jury.").
188. Id.
189. See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004). This new
standard was created "because the direct evidence requirement has been removed from
mixed-motive cases, it is now harder to draw a distinction between McDonnell Douglas
and mixed-motive cases." Id. at 310 (quoting Louis v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd.,
303 F. Supp. 2d 799, 803 (M.D. La. 2003)).
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Douglas analysis. First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination and create an inference of illegal discrimination. 190 The
burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for making an adverse employment decision.'
91
Once the defendant rebuts the inference of illegal discrimination, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence "either (1) that the
defendant's reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination
(pretext alternative); or (2) that the defendant's reason, while true, is only
one of the reasons for its conduct, and another 'motivating factor' is the
plaintiffs protected characteristic (mixed-motive alternative)."', 92 If a
plaintiff is able to show that his protected characteristic was a motivating
factor in the employer's adverse employment decision, the employer must
prove that it would have made the same decision regardless of the
discriminatory factor.' 93 The Modified McDonnell Douglas Group
standard represents a merging of McDonnell Douglas and the Price
Waterhouse approach to proving discrimination.
The McDonnell Douglas or Motivating Factor Group is a middle-of-
the-road approach. 194 In Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance
Co., the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff may survive summary
judgment by using the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis. 95 Alternatively, a plaintiff can "present[] direct or circumstantial
evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an
impermissible factor such as race motivated the employer's adverse
employment decision.' 196 Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), the imper-
missible factor does not have to be the sole factor, but it must have been a
190. Id. at 312.
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865
(M.D.N.C. 2003)).
193. Id.
194. The D.C. and Ninth Circuits are also part of McDonnell Douglas Group Three.
See Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 451 & n* (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that "a plaintiff
can establish an unlawful employment practice by showing that discrimination or
retaliation played a motivating part or was a substantial factor in the employment
decision" or by using the McDonnell Douglas analysis) (internal quotations omitted);
McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
plaintiff "may proceed by using the McDonnell Douglas framework, or alternatively,
may simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory
reason more likely than not motivated" the employer).
195. 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005).
196. Id.
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motivating factor. 197 If so, the plaintiff has a claim for an unlawful
employment practice.198
The McDonnell Douglas or Motivating Factor Group, which allows
the plaintiff to use either the McDonnell Douglas or the motivating factor
standard, is the most faithful to Rule 56. By proceeding under the
motivating factor standard, a plaintiff must "present[] direct or
circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether an impermissible factor, such as race, motivated the employer's
adverse employment decision."' 199 This tracks the language of Rule 56,
which says that a motion for summary judgment will be granted when
there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact."200 Unlike proceeding
under the Baxter standard, employers will be able to dismiss plaintiffs that
are unable to raise a genuine issue of material fact and will be forced to
defend against only those who are capable of meeting such a burden.
Unlike under the McDonnell Douglas Group standard, plaintiffs will be
able to survive summary judgment when they can raise a genuine issue of
material fact and will not be dismissed because they are unable to meet
their ultimate burden at summary judgment. Because of this, the
McDonnell Douglas or Motivating Factor Group standard is the most
faithful to Rule 56.
3. A Necessary Defense of McDonnell Douglas.
The McDonnell Douglas or Motivating Factor Group standard is not
only a superior summary judgment standard to its alternatives because it is
faithful to and consistent with Rule 56, but also because the standard
offers the plaintiff the opportunity to use the McDonnell Douglas method.
Although McDonnell Douglas has been criticized throughout this Note, it
is necessary to briefly defend McDonnell Douglas because it has a very
useful purpose: as a method for the plaintiff to prove discrimination
through circumstantial evidence.20 1 Professor Martin Katz argues that
McDonnell Douglas should be a nonmandatory tool, and he believes that
the problems with McDonnell Douglas have resulted because McDonnell
Douglas has been treated as mandatory.2 02 There are only a few ways for a
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. FED. R. CIv. P. 56.
201. Katz, supra note 48, at 144.
202. See generally id. at 110-44. Katz argues that McDonnell Douglas "should never
be required." Id. at 116. According to Professor Katz, McDonnell Douglas should only be
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plaintiff to prove discrimination and all are fraught with their own
problems.20 3 A plaintiff can prove discrimination through a defendant's
admission, which is extremely rare, or through statements that prove a
tendency to discriminate, which has become increasingly infrequent
because employers have "become more litigation-seasoned., 20 4 Also, a
plaintiff can attempt to prove discrimination through the use of statistics,
but the use of statistics is limited because "this type of proof requires a
large number of decisions by the decisionmaker in order to be useful-
which is unlikely in most workplaces." 20 5 The use of comparative
evidence has also been used to prove discrimination. 20 6 If a black
employee was fired when a white employee was only reprimanded for the
same conduct, that evidence can be used to show that the employer has a
tendency to discriminate. But because two individuals' situations are
rarely similar, this type of evidence is easily distinguishable.20 7
McDonnell Douglas provides a plaintiff the opportunity to present
pretext evidence to the court.208 Unlike other types of evidence offered toshow discrimination, McDonnell Douglas pretext evidence
does not depend on the fortuity of an admission, an overheard
statement, or differently treated coworkers as comparators. It does not
depend on there being a large number of decisions by the
decisionmaker, as statistical evidence does. And it is relatively
inexpensive to put on, as it requires little discovery and no experts.
2
0
9
Likely, McDonnell Douglas pretext evidence is the only evidence
available to a plaintiff.21° Many plaintiffs would be unable to prove
discrimination if the McDonnell Douglas framework was not available to
prove pretext.2 1 1 McDonnell Douglas works very well to deduce evidence
of illegal discrimination for some plaintiffs, and it should be a tool
available to plaintiffs who cannot otherwise create any inference of illegal
discrimination, but it is not designed for every plaintiff pleading an
mandatory if it proved "but-for" causation. Id. at 120. Instead, it proves only "motivating
factor" causation. Id. at 136.
203. Id. at 182.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 182-83.
208. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
209. Katz, supra note 48, at 183.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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employment discrimination case.
The McDonnell Douglas or Motivating Factor Group standard for
summary judgment in mixed-motive discrimination cases is superior to the
other standards because it is the most faithful to Rule 56. This standard
allows a plaintiff to survive summary judgment by showing either that an
illegal reason was a motivating factor or by using the McDonnell Douglas
analysis to prove pretext, and it permits the plaintiff to take full advantage
of all available methods to prove discrimination while remaining faithful
to employers' rights under Rule 56 to seek summary judgment for a
meritless claim.
CONCLUSION
The current standards of summary judgment that are used in mixed-
motive employment discrimination cases are unfaithful to Rule 56. The
new standard established by the Sixth Circuit's decision in White v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp. impermissibly allows claims to survive summary
judgment that should be dismissed under Rule 56.212 Beyond the Sixth
Circuit standard, the remaining courts of appeals are broken into three
groups that apply a version of McDonnell Douglas at the summary
judgment stage. This is problematic because it forces the plaintiff to prove
its ultimate burden at the summary judgment stage. The current four-way
circuit split should be rectified to create some uniformity throughout the
federal courts of appeals. The standard applied by the McDonnell Douglas
or Motivating Factor Group is the most faithful to Rule 56 because a court
will grant summary judgment only when there is "no genuine issue as to
any material fact." 213 That is the appropriate standard under Rule 56.
Requiring the plaintiff to prove more, or the defendant to prove less, at
summary judgment violates Rule 56. Christopher J. Emden *
212. See supra Part III.A.
213. FED. R. CIv. P. 56.
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